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Ethnicity, thE StatE, and thE 
duration of civil War
By Julian WuchErpfEnnig, nilS W. MEttErnich,  
larS-Erik cEdErMan, and kriStian SkrEdE glEditSch*
IntroductIon
a striking characteristic of civil wars is the immense variation in their duration, especially when compared with interstate wars. 
Whereas some civil wars terminate within a few days, others endure 
for decades, including cases like Myanmar or palestine that are still 
unresolved. What accounts for these differences in duration? a key 
hypothesis in the literature points to the role of ethnicity, suggesting 
that ethnic conflicts last longer and are more difficult to settle than 
other civil wars. however, the theoretical and empirical support for this 
proposition remains disputed.
 in this article we reconsider the debate on the impact of ethnicity on 
civil war duration. Shaped by an ethnic, rather than an ideological or 
economic agenda, ethnic civil wars are often argued to exhibit unique 
causes and dynamics,1 including the hypothesis that ethnic civil wars 
last longer. the standard argument points to descent-based attributes 
of ethnicity that cannot be transcended, are reinforced through fighting, 
and thus create a unique sense of belonging that facilitates collective ac-
tion. according to this view, ethnic conflicts quickly become intractable 
due to the rigid nature of ethnic identities, are inherently difficult to 
resolve, and thus tend to last longer.2 an alternative view disputes the 
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3 Mueller 2004; king 2001; gilley 2004.
4 kalyvas 2006.
validity of the ethnic/nonethnic distinction either by suggesting that 
ethnic identities merely provide a cover story for underlying economic 
or private interests and do not affect the conflict dynamics3 or by high-
lighting how ethnic identities can be—and frequently are—transcended 
in civil wars.4 from this perspective, ethnicity as such should not have a 
clear or consistent effect on the dynamics of fighting. this more skepti-
cal view has far-reaching repercussions since it ultimately questions the 
distinction between ethnic and nonethnic conflicts and challenges the 
conceptualization of ethnic groups as meaningful actors in civil wars. 
We argue that much of the controversy in the existing literature stems 
from the untested assumption that ethnic identities primarily influence 
conflict dynamics by facilitating collective action through common net-
works, language, and “sticky” markers. indeed, most studies either fully 
adopt or fully reject this assumption, without considering the possibility 
of a more complex relationship between political processes and ethnic 
identities.
We contribute to the current literature by stressing the political as-
pects of ethnicity. rather than treating conflict as a direct consequence 
of ethnic cleavages, we argue that ethnicity per se does not affect civil 
war duration. instead, whether ethnicity prolongs conflict depends on 
its relationship to political institutions. We provide a dyadic approach 
that emphasizes the political context in which both government lead-
ers and nonstate challengers can capitalize on the ascriptive nature of 
ethnicity. We show that although states can benefit from politicizing 
ethnic relations by selectively providing political or economic goods for 
parts of the population while excluding others, once violent conflict 
breaks out, such policies may backfire on the government and induce 
severe consequences. in particular, past discriminatory policies make 
it less likely that incumbent governments will be able or willing to ac-
cept settlements that could terminate conflicts. past policies of ethnic 
exclusion also operate to the benefit of rebel organizations fighting the 
government, since members of politically excluded ethnic groups har-
bor grievances that increase collective group solidarity and render indi-
vidual fighters more cost tolerant. this, in turn, facilitates the durability 
of rebel organizations.
thus, rather than focusing exclusively on cognitive aspects of ethnic 
identities—for example, information, trust, or common language—that 
are assumed to help overcome collective action problems, our account 
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emphasizes the effects of ethnicity in conjunction with politically in-
duced grievances. in contrast to previous research, our explanation for 
conflict duration stresses the ethnopolitical context of civil wars. in 
short, we add causal depth to the link between ethnicity and conflict 
duration by focusing on state-induced ethnic policies.
We also test our theoretical arguments empirically by drawing on a 
new data set that systematically links rebel organizations to politically 
relevant ethnic groups, allowing us to capture the dyadic dynamics im-
plied by our theory. our analysis allows us to identify the conditions 
under which ethnicity prolongs civil wars and to distinguish between 
underlying ethnic identities and politicized grievances. We find that 
ethnicity matters primarily in situations of exclusionary ethnonational-
ist state policies. thus, contrary to what is assumed by many scholars, 
we find no evidence that ethnicity per se has inherent effects on conflict 
dynamics.
the article is organized as follows. We first provide a brief review 
of the relevant literature on civil war dynamics. We then introduce the 
logic of ethnopolitical exclusion that lies at the core of the argument. 
this allows us to articulate our theory of civil war duration. the follow-
ing section introduces our data, followed by the main results, including 
a brief discussion of sensitivity analyses. the final section concludes.
ExIstIng approachEs to cIvIl war duratIon
Existing approaches to civil war duration fall largely into two catego-
ries. first, many of the efforts to understand the dramatic upsurge of 
civil wars during the early 1990s suggested that these were conflicts 
fought between distinct ethnic groups. Much of this research referred 
to the conflicts in yugoslavia, the former Soviet union, Burundi, and 
rwanda as paradigmatic cases. drawing on international relations the-
ory, posen explains these conflicts as the result of an ethnic security 
dilemma caused by state breakdown and the absence of a functioning 
government.5 according to this perspective, ethnic groups engage in 
preemptive violence in weak state environments because they fear for 
their own survival. it is argued that core determinants of the severity of 
the security dilemma are the particular history of intergroup relations, 
as well as the physical and ethnic geography that groups face.6 the 
hypothesized dynamics of this approach have important implications 
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for the duration of such conflicts. although not all civil wars are ethnic, 
civil wars fought between ethnic groups are held to evolve quickly into 
intractable conflicts and therefore endure much longer than noneth-
nic civil wars.7 this perspective is based on the assumption that ethnic 
identities are fixed. according to kaufmann:8
Ethnic conflicts are disputes between communities which see themselves as 
having distinct heritages, over the power relationship between the communities, 
while ideological civil wars are contests between factions within the same com-
munity over how that community should be governed. the key difference is the 
flexibility of individual loyalties, which are quite fluid in ideological conflicts, 
but almost completely rigid in ethnic wars.
Moreover, battles, massacres, and other forms of violence are expected 
to harden these identities to the point where compromise is delegiti-
mized.9 as a consequence, continued fighting is characterized as nearly 
inevitable, leading to a “spiral of escalation” that renders these conflicts 
particularly difficult, if not impossible, to resolve without third-party 
intervention.10 indeed, proponents of this view go so far as to claim that 
partition is the only possible solution to such conflicts.11
the second, opposing view argues against the theoretical distinction 
between ethnic and nonethnic civil wars, since most quantitative stud-
ies indicate no significant relationship between conflict and common 
indicators of ethnic diversity such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
or ethnic polarization.12 rebel organizations, rather than ethnic groups, 
are deemed the appropriate unit of analysis.13 Many scholars who sub-
scribe to this approach highlight how fighting in civil war is driven by 
incentives to secure private gains. Such insurgencies are most likely to 
emerge and endure under conditions of state weakness, allowing rebel 
organizations to sustain successful operations similar to firms.14 While 
some researchers opt for the more neutral “rebel organizations” label,15 
7 kaufmann 1996; kaufmann 1998; rose 2000; kaufman 2001; kaufman 2006; horowitz 1985; 
van Evera 2001.
8 kaufmann 1996, 138.
9 kaufman 2006, 205.
10 kaufman 2006.
11 kaufmann 1996.
12 collier 2000; fearon 2004; cunningham 2006; cunningham 2010; Brandt et al. 2008; cun-
ningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; although see collier, hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Mon-
talvo and reynal-Querol 2010.
13 Sinno 2008; kalyvas 2008; Brubaker 2004. an important argument in favor of this view is that 
rebel organizations are always present in civil wars, whether they are linked to ethnic groups or not 
(cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009).
14 fearon and laitin 2003; collier and hoeffler 2004.
15 for example, kalyvas 2006.
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others are more subjective—referring to the rebels as “greedy bandits”16 
or equating insurgents with “criminals,” “thugs,” or “warlord gangs.”17 
the underlying nature of rebel organizations has important theoretical 
implications for how quickly conflicts can be resolved. collier, hoef-
fler, and Söderbom argue, for example, that the presence of looting op-
portunities prolongs conflicts, since they raise rebel revenues and lower 
recruitment costs.18
While approaches rooted in the logic of security dilemmas between 
fixed groups tend to claim that ethnic wars will last longer, little sys-
tematic evidence has been provided in support of this assertion. indeed, 
the claim rests on the untested assumption that facilitating collective 
action is the causal mechanism through which ethnic identities can in-
fluence conflict. although these conclusions have been bolstered by 
case studies of ethnic conflicts that appear consistent with this argu-
ment, they have also been challenged by more systematic quantitative 
research indicating no significant relationship between ethnic diversity 
and conflict. this article is motivated by the need to reconcile these 
divergent findings theoretically and empirically.
While both the group-based and the rebel-groups-as-firms perspec-
tives have generated important insights, they are also united by a shared 
theoretical shortcoming: the alleged passivity or even the absence of the 
state as an actor.19 indeed, by emphasizing state breakdown and state 
weakness, in both explanations the state is largely absent by assumption.20 
We believe that such monadic approaches are problematic for at least 
two reasons. first, they stand in stark contrast to the underlying defini-
tion of civil war, since fighting in civil wars involves the state by neces-
sity.21 Second, as we will argue below, the omission is critical because it 
neglects the political context of many conflicts, including the state itself 
as an active actor pursuing a set of distinct objectives and motivations.
in sum, the theoretical effect of ethnicity is disputed and the subject 
of ongoing debate. Broadly speaking, many scholars either treat ethnic 
identities as irrelevant to conflict or assume that conflict occurs between 
fixed identities. We believe that the role of ethnicity is theoretically and 
empirically underspecified, mainly because the political context within 
which ethnic mobilization occurs is ignored. We address the crucial 
question of the specific causal mechanisms through which ethnicity may 
16 collier and hoeffler 2004.
17 Mueller 2003.
18 collier, hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004. See also Buhaug, gates, and lujala 2009; fearon 2004.
19 for exceptions, see Weiner 1978; fearon 2004; fearon and laitin 2011.
20 cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010.
21 Sambanis 2004.
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have an effect by highlighting how the combination of state-induced 
grievances and ascriptive ethnicity leads to longer conflicts. the com-
bination arises from particular ethnopolitical configurations, which we 
outline in the next section. this allows us subsequently to develop a 
political and dyadic approach that theorizes both a nonstate challenger 
and the state in the context of ethnic politics.
thE logIc of EthnopolItIcal ExclusIon
Before turning to our theory of civil war duration, we focus in this sec-
tion on the political interactions at the core of our theory. We show 
how one particular political strategy that incumbent governments can 
pursue—ethnic exclusion—helps account for why states and rebel or-
ganizations engage in costly conflict in the first place. clausewitz fa-
mously argued that “war is merely the continuation of politics by other 
means.”22 along the same lines, we argue that underlying political aims 
provide the driving motivations of both governments and nonstate 
challengers in combat. We then proceed by showing how this interac-
tion conditions the fighting behavior of both incumbent governments 
and challengers.
Ethnic exclusion is a political strategy enacted by those control-
ling the state. it aims to secure their political, cultural, and economic 
interests by selectively excluding parts of the population from access 
to valuable political and economic goods on ethnic grounds. But such 
exclusion comes at a substantial cost, as it often invites strong reac-
tions from potential challengers, and those affected may even resort 
to violent challenges against the state. unfortunately, little is known 
about the determinants of exclusion. nevertheless, drawing on sparse 
existing literature, we discuss the costs and benefits of ethnic exclusion, 
both from the perspective of the state and from the perspective of rebel 
organizations. this enables us to show how the motivations, prefer-
ences, and constraints of these actors, and hence the duration of their 
violent struggles, are powerfully conditioned by state-induced patterns 
of ethnic exclusion.
Excluding particular ethnic groups from access to state power has 
symbolic, material, and political advantages for incumbent govern-
ments. first, the most obvious benefit is that exclusion facilitates the 
consolidation of state power, hence increasing the political power of 
included groups. political representation and power status thus rein-
22 clausewitz 1984 [1832], 87.
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force the subjective worth of one’s group vis-à-vis other groups and 
legitimize the group’s striving for power and representation. indeed, 
control over statehood ensures the ability to govern a “homeland” and 
the freedom to speak the group’s preferred language and to practice its 
religion.
Second, in addition to cultural benefits, control over the state bu-
reaucracy implies that coethnics can experience positive discrimination 
in material terms, through taxation or other forms of extraction and the 
(regional) allocation of public goods.23 in this context, through its as-
criptive marks, ethnicity imposes categorical, rather than fluid, bound-
aries. thus, unlike ideology, ethnicity is “sticky” and cannot easily be 
transcended. this makes it an ideal criterion for the selective provision 
of goods.24 Because of their relatively clear boundaries, ethnic groups 
are usually more serviceable groups than classes, an observation that 
has repercussions for war duration. Moreover, for elites, nepotism and 
clientelism can secure a strong base of support and thus the political 
survival of leaders. Such practices frequently extend to recruitment into 
sensitive state agencies like the police or armed forces; this in turn se-
cures the group’s survival over the long run.25
third, exclusion can also originate from direct security concerns. 
roessler argues that ethnic exclusion can act as a strategy of threat 
displacement when there is a high probability of leadership turnover 
from within the state.26 in such situations, rulers attempt to safeguard 
their regimes against coups by excluding coconspirators. this can help 
avoid the commitment problem that arises when divided elites jointly 
control a state’s coercive apparatus but cannot guarantee that corul-
ers will refrain from resorting to violence. finally, in democracies and 
semidemocracies, governing elites may feel tempted to secure their po-
sition through ethnic outbidding and diversionary war against a do-
mestic minority.27
the state elites’ main cost of ethnic exclusion arises from the risk 
that it may backfire against the regime. this can happen for a num-
ber of reasons. first, by its very nature, exclusion generates benefits for 
some at the expense of others. as a consequence, it is likely to gen-
erate grievances, with excluded groups likely to be a particularly fer-
tile breeding ground for rebellion.28 violations of norms of justice and 
23 cederman, Weidmann, and gleditsch 2011.
24 rothchild 1981, 222; fearon 1999; tilly 2007.
25 rothchild 1981; Wimmer 2002.
26 roessler 2011.
27 tir and Jasinski 2008.
28 gurr 1993.
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equality will typically arouse feelings of anger and resentment among 
members of the disadvantaged group.29 Where exclusion is enduring 
and indiscriminate, it is likely to breed collective grievances and “rein-
force the plausibility and justifiability of a radical political orientation 
or collective identity.”30 in the words of John f. kennedy: “those who 
make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevi-
table.” With institutional channels for conflict resolution perceived to 
be blocked, this lack of meaningful access to state institutions gives rise 
to politically induced radicalization of grievance-based claims.31 previ-
ous research has demonstrated that such conditions are more likely to 
cause conflict onset.32 Moreover, where exclusion is already in place, it 
tends to be taken for granted and legitimized by its beneficiaries. roth-
child states that “favored ethnic groups come to take a proprietary view 
of their traditional overrepresentation, or even monopoly position.”33 
however, precisely because exclusion generates feelings of resentment 
and fosters radicalism, it raises the costs of turning the tables. a future 
loss of the benefits derived from exclusion implies a high price to pay, 
since groups that recently came to power are likely to seek revenge 
or otherwise exploit their newly acquired power. this commitment 
problem is likely to be particularly severe under minority rule. Even if 
governments try to acquiesce to the challenger, a further commitment 
problem arises if past experiences make challengers unlikely to consider 
such an offer credible. the case of liberia is a powerful illustration of 
these dynamics, where the 1980 coup headed by Master Sergeant doe 
put an end to 133 years of minority rule by the americo-liberians and 
resulted in the persecution of americo-liberian elites.34 this period of 
active discrimination against americo-liberians lasted until charles 
taylor gained the presidency in 1997.
Second, compared with inclusive policies, exclusion publicly demon-
strates a lack of willingness to compromise. By contrast, where political 
power is shared, the government has demonstrated at least minimal 
willingness to compromise, even if the actual arrangements are not al-
ways fully satisfactory in practice, as occurred in Burundi, where con-
flict occurred despite power sharing. Still, the mere fact that ethnic 
groups are not categorically excluded from public goods or even openly 
discriminated against demonstrates that compromise is possible and 
29 petersen 2002; Williams 2003.
30 goodwin 1997, 16.
31 hafez 2003.
32 gurr 1993, 2000; cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010.
33 rothchild 1981, 217.
34 Ballah and abrokwaa 2003.
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“discourages the sense that the state is unreformable […] and needs to 
be fundamentally overhauled.”35
finally, due to concerns about reputation, ethnic groups that are in 
power and have implemented exclusionary policies may find them-
selves unable to grant partial concessions to challengers. Walter argues 
that governments have incentives to deny favorable settlements to early 
challengers in the presence of other potential challengers in order to 
avoid demonstration effects and to signal strength, since concessions 
could ultimately lead to state erosion.36 in sum, ethnic exclusion is po-
tentially very risky, and incumbent governments are, as a rule, aware 
of this. We therefore conclude that the benefits must be deemed to 
outweigh such costs when exclusion strategies are enacted. this simple 
analysis thereby provides leverage on the motivations and preferences 
of incumbent governments.
consEquEncEs for cIvIl war duratIon
having outlined the logic of ethnopolitical exclusion, we are now ready 
to theorize its effect on the duration of civil wars. Whereas existing 
theories tend to be monadic by considering merely the actions of non-
state challengers, our approach is explicit about the dyadic interaction 
between the state and the nonstate actors as the main protagonists, each 
of which is pursuing a distinct set of objectives. the logic we present is 
similar to a two-level game; incumbent governments and nonstate chal-
lengers also interact with their followers as they depend on the support 
of their respective bases. our core argument is that the combination 
of ascriptive ethnicity and political exclusion makes it difficult both 
for rebel groups fighting on behalf of excluded ethnic groups and for 
incumbent governments to reach settlements that would allow for ef-
fective conflict resolution, thus leading to protracted conflicts.
 our theoretical rationale is based on a per period logic visualized in 
figure 1. We conceptualize the dynamics of civil war as sequential 
rounds of bargaining and fighting. during each round, there are three 
possible “outcomes”: (1) the belligerents can reach a mutually accept-
able agreement that terminates the fighting, (2) either side capitulates 
and accepts defeat, resulting in winner and a loser, or (3) continued 
fighting if neither 1 nor 2 is possible. from our perspective, both 1 
and 2 entail conflict settlements, although they obviously represent 
different distributions of the underlying incompatibility between the 
35 goodwin 1997, 18.
36 Walter 2009.
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belligerents. We follow Wittman and goemans, who argue that conflict 
termination—short of complete eradication of the opponent, which is 
extremely rare—necessarily requires both parties to agree on a settle-
ment, including losses as implicit settlements, since the other party 
would otherwise continue to fight.37 following this logic, explaining 
duration thus amounts to accounting for what prevents the belligerents 
from reaching a settlement during each round. in other words, if both 
victories and agreements are less likely, there is implicitly a larger prob-
ability that conflict continues and long durations must follow.
our approach focuses explicitly on the actors. in contrast to most 
existing work, we conceptualize the state as an active agent with dis-
tinct preferences and motivations. the primary interest of the state is 
to maintain, secure, and maximize power. rather than focusing on ei-
ther rebel organizations or ethnic groups as the challengers, we analyze 
their connection directly. our theoretical point of departure follows 
kalyvas’s concern that the “relation [of rebel organizations] to underly-
ing populations must be the object of systematic theoretical and em-
pirical investigation as opposed to mere assumption.”38 thus, whereas 
many authors simply assert the putative irrelevance of ethnicity based 
on the varying connection to ethnicity in rebel organizations, we take 
this concern seriously by focusing systematically on variation within 
the nexus between rebel organizations and ethnic groups and conflict 
duration. in brief, conceptualizing fighting in civil wars as violence be-
tween the state and nonstate actors, both of which may or may not be 
37 Wittman 1979; goemans 2000.
38 kalyvas 2008, 1063.
agreement agreement
continue continuecontinue
victory victory
fIgurE 1 
sEquEntIal fIghtIng In cIvIl wars
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characterized by an explicit link to ethnic groups, allows us to capture a 
broad range of actor constellations.
We assume that rebel organizations are political entrepreneurs seek-
ing to mobilize and sustain sufficient capacity to overthrow the gov-
ernment and challenge the government’s force monopoly, either in the 
entire country or locally in some limited territory.39 rebel organizations 
face two key challenges. first, they need to recruit a sufficient number 
of people to mount an effective challenge to the government.40 But 
initial recruitment is insufficient to sustain armed conflict; rebel orga-
nizations must in equal measure create incentives to retain recruits for 
longer periods of time in order to fulfill the goals of the rebellion. in 
other words, rebel organizations need to find ways to ensure that fight-
ers do not abandon the rebellion.
our analysis builds on two mechanisms that contribute to retaining 
fighters: (1) greater cost tolerance and commitment and (2) increased 
group solidarity. these mechanisms are closely interrelated under the 
particular ethnopolitical configurations that we highlight. We first focus 
on mechanisms that emphasize the fact that mobilizing and retaining 
fighters requires individual-level compensation. our argument is that 
variation in the reward structure—time horizons in particular—helps to 
explain why some organizations survive longer than others.41 We extend 
this literature by emphasizing how this reward structure is shaped not 
only by economic opportunities or fixed social structures and networks42 
but also by state-imposed ethnopolitical power configurations. this 
approach increases the causal depth as compared with conventional 
approaches to war duration by identifying the conditions under which 
ethnicity matters and entails specific empirical implications.
in essence, we argue that state-induced ethnonationalist policies that 
exclude and discriminate against specific ethnic groups generate griev-
ances within the affected groups. When rebel groups claim to operate 
on behalf of such ethnic groups, fighters are initially attracted by the 
prospects of political representation or better economic access once the 
government is defeated. however, unlike immediate material payoffs, 
such a reward structure is associated with a great deal of uncertainty 
because it is conditional on the future success of the rebel organiza-
tion. if recruitment and sustained combat are linked to uncertain future 
39 Buhaug 2006.
40 gates 2002.
41 Weinstein 2007.
42 cf. Weinstein 2007.
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rewards, then conflicts should be more likely to be persistent when 
opportunity costs are low. More specifically, whereas conventional ap-
proaches champion arguments about opportunity structure and gen-
erally downplay the actors,43 we argue that the socioeconomic and 
ethnopolitical context of potential recruits itself shapes individual and 
collective motivations to fight.44 due to greater cost tolerance, claims 
about uncertain future benefits resonate particularly well in the pres-
ence of grievances. although such grievances can arise in many scenar-
ios, we focus on the ethnonationalist policies of the state. challengers 
who are blocked from access to state institutions seek to escape the rule 
of dominant ethnic groups by either seizing control of the government 
or seceding from the state.45
Ethnic groups excluded from state power are deprived of politi-
cal representation and likely to be disadvantaged in access to govern-
ment services. Such ethnic exclusion manifests itself in everyday life, 
and members of excluded groups are often subject to humiliation and 
treated as second-class citizens. there is a strong linkage between the 
individual and the collective, insofar as ethnic exclusion operates along 
categorical lines that are difficult to overcome at the level of the indi-
vidual. “Wrongs” by dominant groups, such as the above-mentioned 
everyday humiliation and the systematic denial of state benefits—in-
cluding being excluded from public goods and also injuries and human 
losses suffered by fellow group members—are likely to be perceived 
collectively by members of the group. oberschall has coined this a 
“multiplier effect.”46 Such dynamics are likely to result in reinforced 
group solidarity and collective grievances, which in turn affect the level 
of grievances at the individual level. fighters from excluded ethnic 
groups are therefore generally more cost tolerant and more committed. 
Moreover, precisely because ethnic exclusion operates along categorical 
boundaries, increased group solidarity is likely to raise the cost of free 
riding, as group policing gains legitimacy.47 at the same time, these 
dynamics can also feed into the hands of extremists, who can exploit 
them to gain momentum and reinforce grievances.48
at a more systemic level, such variation in the reward structure also 
implies systematic differences in regard to the vulnerability to exogenous 
43 for example, fearon and laitin 2003; collier and hoeffler 2004.
44 horowitz 1985. in other words, aggrieved individuals are more likely to engage and sustain 
fighting, independently of opportunity structures.
45 cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010.
46 oberschall 2007.
47 hechter and okamoto 2001.
48 hafez 2003.
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shocks.49 Since rebel organizations composed of opportunistic fight-
ers are heavily dependent on a steady cash flow, factors that negatively 
impact their financial sources are likely to undermine the rebellion. for 
example, where rebellion is financed through lootable resources, losing 
control over relevant sites such as diamond mines can have severe ef-
fects on the viability of the movement. By contrast, rebel organizations 
that rely on the hearts and minds of broader populations are less likely 
to be affected by such shocks.
in sum, members of excluded ethnic groups are more likely to con-
tinue fighting, which allows rebel organizations to endure, than are re-
cruits who have not suffered from exclusion. hence, it is no surprise 
that the efforts of the african national congress (anc) resonated with 
the nonwhite ethnic groups during the apartheid era in South africa. 
By contrast, members of groups included in the political process enjoy 
political rights and the benefits of state provision. Moreover, since non-
excluded populations are not categorically disadvantaged, the grievance 
multiplier effect is less effective. as a consequence, organizations as-
sociated with ethnic groups in power are less inclined to endure very 
long periods of fighting, as are rebellions organized around classes or 
ideologies that do not benefit from categorical boundaries.
thus far we have outlined why rebel organizations recruiting from 
excluded ethnic groups are better able to sustain long fighting. By itself, 
however, this is not a sufficient explanation for long duration, since it 
does not tell us why such organizations are less likely to reach any type 
of settlement that could end the fighting, whether an implicit settle-
ment through victory or accepting defeat or an explicit one in the form 
of a negotiated agreement. in other words, we need to show why rebel 
organizations associated with excluded ethnic groups are associated 
with lower probabilities of incumbent and challenger victories, as well 
as lower probabilities of negotiated agreements. We will address these 
three options.
We stipulate that the features that enable rebel organizations to re-
cruit from excluded ethnic groups also render them harder for the gov-
ernment to defeat. given the typically asymmetric nature of warfare in 
civil wars, there is often a possibility for violence by spoilers.50 as we 
have already argued, ethnic exclusion sows the seeds of extremism and 
polarization. Moreover, deeply entrenched collective grievances and 
a steady supply of fighters from a large pool that is characterized by 
49 cf. fearon and laitin 2007.
50 Stedman 1997.
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strong group solidarity and high cost tolerance can make it very diffi-
cult for the government to achieve decisive victory. for example, it took 
the Sri lankan military forces nearly twenty-six years to finally defeat 
the tamil tigers in 2009, and conflicts in palestine and Burma remain 
ongoing. By contrast, rebel organizations that draw from included eth-
nic groups or do not recruit and justify their activities along ethnic 
lines at all cannot benefit from the same levels of individual and col-
lective grievances, since they lack the categorical division and solidarity 
that results from politicized ethnicity. to see this, consider the Eritrean 
islamic Jihad Movement (EIjm), whose Muslim base is not excluded 
from central power along categorical lines, or the various rebellions in 
latin america, such as El Salvador, venezuela, or colombia, where 
conflicts involved mainly military factions that did not display explicit 
ethnic linkages.
Why are governments unable to reach peace agreements with their 
challengers? as we have argued in the previous section, accepting some-
thing that will be perceived as a defeat is particularly risky in situations 
of politically induced grievances. resentment and other emotional leg-
acies51 raise the costs of turning the tables, since those who were previ-
ously in power may become excluded and discriminated against in the 
future. Ethnicity’s ascriptive nature bolsters this argument, since mem-
bers of the former group in power are easily detected and hence may be 
excluded. thus, ethnicity’s categorical dividing line provides a structure 
that allows for efforts to seek ethnic exclusion in the first place. Such 
arguments are generally less applicable in cases where exclusion occurs 
on the grounds of class membership or ideology, since such definitions 
of group memberships are less rigid and more difficult to establish.52
More generally, as Walter has forcefully argued, governments may 
face reputation costs when giving in to the challenger’s demands, since 
doing so would signal weakness and invite other potential challengers 
to put forward similar demands.53 Even where a rebel victory does not 
imply a change in the central government but is confined to granting 
territorial autonomy or secession, incumbent governments will have 
strong reasons not to give in to a challenger’s demands. furthermore, 
since members of ethnic groups in power frequently view their superior 
power status as just and legitimate, concessions may be hard to justify 
to the government’s own constituency or ethnic group.54
51 petersen 2002.
52 rothchild 1981, 222; fearon 1999; tilly 1999; tilly 2007.
53 Walter 2009.
54 rothchild 1981.
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finally, we argue that negotiated agreements are less likely when 
states engage in ethnopolitical exclusion and rebel organizations recruit 
and claim to operate on behalf of ethnic groups. as argued above, not 
only is ethnic exclusion likely to breed polarization and extremism but it 
also powerfully reinforces the subjective value of power status, territory, 
and statehood among both incumbent governments and ethnonation-
alist challengers. the subjective characteristics of nationalist exclusion 
suggest then that the state is not easily shared under competing nation-
alist claims and is sometimes even rendered indivisible. in other words, 
exclusion leads to a small (or nonexistent) bargaining range that makes 
compromise difficult. hasner, toft, and goddard present similar argu-
ments about indivisible territory,55 but the same logic also applies to 
issues of statehood, representation, and redistribution, to name but a 
few. in addition, roessler argues that incumbent governments may fear 
power-sharing arrangements, since coconspirators may abuse their ac-
cess to state forces in a coup d’état.56 thus, we argue that agreements 
are particularly difficult to achieve between governments and rebel or-
ganizations linked to ethnic groups that have been excluded.
in sum, we outline a dyadic approach to the duration of civil war that 
emphasizes the ethnonationalist context. By putting together the indi-
vidual components, we can now derive the main proposition, namely, 
that rebel organizations fighting on behalf of excluded groups are less 
likely to see any type of settlement, including decisive victories and 
losses, as well as negotiated agreements. as they are more likely to con-
tinue fighting, conflicts with such rebel organizations will tend to be 
longer than conflicts fought by organizations associated with groups 
that do not face exclusion on the basis of ethnic identity:
h1a. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of 
excluded ethnic groups fight longer than rebel organizations without an 
explicit ethnic linkage.
h1b. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups fight longer than rebel organizations recruiting from 
and fighting on behalf of included ethnic groups.
our argument implies, on the one hand, that governments which 
engage in risky exclusion find themselves trapped in a dilemma that 
makes it very difficult to grant concessions to the challenger. as a con-
sequence, governments have strong reasons to defend their position in 
what becomes framed as all-or-nothing conflicts. on the other hand, 
55 hassner 2003; toft 2003; goddard 2006.
56 roessler 2011.
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rebel organizations can benefit from a pool of potential recruits with 
strong grievances, thus contributing to the organizations’ durability. 
this combination of the government’s inability to compromise and the 
challenger’s ability to keep fighting explains why conflicts occurring 
in the name of excluded ethnic groups tend to be particularly endur-
ing. the politics of ethnic exclusion thus imply that governments have 
incentives to keep particular conflicts from termination and instead to 
keep them alive and let them linger (possibly at low levels of intensity) 
in order to avoid any settlement at all. this theoretical argument yields 
additional testable implications. Before turning to the empirical sec-
tion, we therefore formulate the following set of hypotheses:
h2a. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups are less likely to achieve victory than rebel organiza-
tions without an explicit ethnic linkage.
h2b. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups are less likely to achieve victory than rebel organiza-
tions recruiting from and fighting on behalf of included ethnic groups.
h3a. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups are less likely to be defeated than rebel organizations 
without an explicit ethnic linkage.
h3b. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups are less likely to be defeated than rebel organizations 
recruiting from and fighting on behalf of included ethnic groups.
h4a. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups are less likely to obtain negotiated agreements than 
rebel organizations without an explicit ethnic linkage.
h4b. rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of ex-
cluded ethnic groups are less likely to obtain negotiated agreements than 
rebel organizations recruiting from and fighting on behalf of included 
ethnic groups.
data and EmpIrIcal stratEgy
codIng thE group-organIzatIon nExus
in order to test our propositions, we draw on a new data project that 
systematically codes the linkage between ethnic groups and rebel orga-
nizations. this project links two existing data sets: the non-State actor 
(nsa) data set,57 which builds directly on the ucdp/prIo armed con-
flict dataset (acd),58 and the Ethnic power relations (Epr) data set on 
57 cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009.
58 gleditsch et al. 2002.
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politically relevant ethnic groups worldwide.59 thus, we avoid some 
of the problems in previous subjective assessments of whether a given 
conflict is ethnic or not, by examining the explicit linkage between rebel 
organizations and ethnic groups. figure 2 outlines the structure of the 
data set, which we label acd2Epr. focusing on rebel organizations 
rather than on ethnic groups as the unit of analysis has the advantage of 
seamlessly relating our theoretical considerations to the empirical anal-
ysis. Moreover, since some conflicts involve more than one rebel organi-
zation,60 we are able to differentiate between organizations that pursue 
an ethnic agenda versus those that do not within the same conflict.
drawing on information included in Epr, we further determine 
whether or not the ethnic groups within a rebel organization are subject 
to state-induced exclusionary policies. this then allows us to establish 
the ethnopolitical context of particular rebel organizations. finally, note 
that the mapping is many-to-many, as a given rebel organization can 
share linkages with multiple ethnic groups and a single ethnic group 
can be connected to multiple rebel organizations (see figure 2).
Based on our theory we focus on two necessary criteria with regard 
to the linkage between ethnic groups and rebel organizations. the first 
criterion assesses the ethnicity of the fighters. put differently, we code 
from which ethnic groups, if any, a particular rebel organization recruits 
fighters. We require that a significant number of the group members 
actively participate in the organization’s combat operations in order to 
assert such a linkage.61 recruitment along ethnic lines is by itself insuf-
ficient because it may merely be the result of local availability and not a 
deliberate strategy or related to an organization’s actual agenda. there-
fore our second necessary criterion is whether a given rebel organization 
publicly announces that it is operating on behalf of the relevant ethnic 
group, that is, whether it pursues an objective that is directly linked to 
the group’s fate. We label this an exclusive claim, because the stated 
objective is to provide selective benefits for groups.62 if recruitment and 
claim occur jointly, we code a rebel organization as “ethnic.” to illus-
trate, consider the case of liberia. Whereas rebel organizations fighting 
in the first liberian civil war (1989–96)—for example, the national 
59 cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010.
60 cunningham 2006; cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Metternich and Wucherpfen-
nig 2010.
61 We deliberately chose not to impose a fixed threshold because it is difficult to impossible to 
obtain reliable numbers of recruitment, especially for conflicts that are long past and not well docu-
mented. nevertheless, in the absence of a “rebel census” the data constitute an imperfect yet reasonable 
attempt to capture the main patterns of recruitment.
62 By contrast, inclusive claims would pertain to the country’s entire population, as would be the 
case with incompatibilities over ideologies.
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patriotic front of liberia (npfl) and the independent national patri-
otic front of liberia (Inpfl)—meet both criteria of ethnic recruitment 
and claim involving the gio, Mano, and other indigenous groups,63 this 
does not hold for the second liberian civil war (2000–2003). although 
fighters by the lurd were predominantly recruited from the Mandingo 
and krahn (guere) in the latter war, the organization’s sole stated pur-
pose was to remove charles taylor from office. We therefore coded this 
rebel organization as nonethnic.64
63 Bøås 2001; harris 2006.
64 the national union for the total independence of angola (unIta) is another example. al-
though its fighters were predominantly from the ovimbundu-ovambu, the organization’s stated goals 
were explicitly multiethnic and encompassing and thus not exclusive.
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acd2Epr: rElatIonshIp bEtwEEn EthnIc groups and rEbEl 
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codIng EthnonatIonalIst polItIcs
Much of the current literature equates ethnicity in civil wars with rigid 
identities, while disregarding more variable political motivations and 
consequences linked to ethnonationalist policies. By contrast, we argue 
that ethnonationalist policies of ethnic exclusion signal particular mo-
tivations that governments may pursue when confronted with violent 
challengers. Moreover, as an externality, such policies are likely to sys-
tematically induce strong grievances among excluded ethnic groups.65 
Members of such groups are more likely to exhibit strong grievances 
than are other individuals. it is this macropolitical context that rein-
forces collective solidarity and alters the individual-level cost tolerance 
of the fighters in rebel organizations linked to ethnic groups.
 the Epr data set contains information about the ethnopolitical power 
status of ethnic groups. our acd2Epr mapping allows us to integrate 
this information at the level of rebel organizations. Since our argument 
relates directly to issues of nationalism, such as ethnic representation 
and statehood, we limit the realm of politics to the set of policies under 
the direct influence of a country’s executive branch. this can amount to 
control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the admin-
istration, depending on a given country’s power constellations. thus, 
where an explicit ethnic linkage between an ethnic group and a rebel 
organization exists, we assess whether the group was excluded from or 
included in state power. More precisely, Epr indicates (1) whether repre-
sentatives of an ethnic category are discriminated against, are powerless, 
or have merely regional or separatist autonomy, or (2) whether groups 
hold power in the domain of national politics, either fully or as part of a 
governing coalition between more than one ethnic group.66 this allows 
us to differentiate between ethnic rebel organizations with and with-
out mobilized fighters along ethnonationalist lines against a common 
baseline of rebel organizations with no ethnic linkage. Examples for 
the latter type of rebel organization include the revolutionary armed 
forces of colombia (farc). prominent examples of rebel organizations 
drawing from included groups are the palipehutu and ubumwe of Bu-
rundi in the early 1990s, drawing from the hutu population, as well as 
the Slovenes and the croats in the former yugoslavia, all of which were 
then represented within power-sharing arrangements. By contrast, the 
65 cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010.
66 for example, armenians, azeri, and russians had no noticeable influence on national execu-
tive politics between 1946 and 2005 in tbilisi and are therefore coded as powerless, that is, excluded. 
lebanon is an example for a shared power at the level of national politics, since cabinet positions are 
allocated across groups following precise constitutional guidelines.
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kurdistan Workers’ party (pkk) in turkey and the Sudan people’s lib-
eration Movement (splm) and anya nya in Sudan (linked to various 
southern christian/animist groups) are examples of long-lasting rebel 
organizations with linkages to excluded ethnic groups.67
control varIablEs
We also consider a set of control variables plausibly related to both 
exclusion and conflict duration. Much of the literature on civil war du-
ration emphasizes the importance of lootable resources in the conflict 
zone for financing rebellion. We rely on data by Buhaug, gates, and 
lujala that indicate the presence of three types of resources in the area 
where the conflict takes place, namely, gemstones, petroleum and drugs, 
all coded as dummy variables.68 the nsa data set provides a series of 
relevant variables on rebel organizations.69 the variable Territorial Con-
trol indicates whether rebel organizations have actual territorial control 
over some area in the country. Strong Central Command is a variable that 
indicates whether a rebel organization has a coherent command struc-
ture. additionally, we include a dummy variable for Legal Political Wing 
providing information about whether a potential rebel organization has 
a political wing and its legal status. Territorial Conflict codes whether 
the incompatibility was over territory, rather than the government.70 at 
the country level we include a Democracy dummy indicating whether 
a country has a polity score equal to or greater than 6. furthermore, 
we control for the “usual suspects” GDP per Capita and Population of a 
country.71 other control variables are introduced below.
mEthod and EmpIrIcal rEsults
to test our main hypotheses we estimate a series of semiparametric 
models for the hazard of conflict termination for specific rebel orga-
nizations. the dyadic data set includes 290 rebel organizations in 198 
conflicts between 1946 and 2005.72 We code information potentially 
down to the individual dyad-day. our data include 637,585 dyad-days, 
67 We emphasize that ethnic exclusion is relatively orthogonal to measures of democracy: the first 
order pearson correlations with a measure of polity and a binary democracy indicator are .10 and .09, 
respectively.
68 Buhaug, gates, and lujala 2009.
69 cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009.
70 See Buhaug 2006.
71 hegre and Sambanis 2006.
72 the nsa data build on the ucdp/prIo armed conflict data (gleditsch et al. 2002), a twenty-
five battle deaths per year threshold, and a conventional rule to ignore gaps in fighting of less than 
two years to determine whether a conflict is ongoing. Moreover, because Epr covers only independent 
states, wars of decolonization are excluded from the sample, as are periods of state collapse.
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which we aggregate to 1941 unique spells that represent actual changes 
in any of the time-varying covariates. out of the 290 rebel-government 
dyads 18 are right censored. the average fighting duration of a rebel 
organization is 2207 days (about 6 years) with the median duration be-
ing 758 days (about 2.1 years).
 We estimate cox proportional hazards models, since our theoretical 
considerations do not predict a specific functional form of the underly-
ing baseline hazard. this leaves the duration dependence unspecified 
and focuses our empirical analysis on how the covariates shift the base-
line hazard.73 We estimate all models using clustered standard errors to 
account for possible interdependence between dyads within the same 
conflict. preliminary analysis revealed that coups differ in their base-
line hazard to other conflicts. to allow for different underlying baseline 
hazards of coups and noncoups, we stratify all models by coups.
We first estimate a series of cox-proportional hazards models to test 
our main hypotheses (h1a and h1b) that rebel organizations which 
recruit from, and claim to operate on behalf of, excluded ethnic groups 
fight longer than rebel organizations linked to included ethnic groups 
or organizations without an explicit ethnic linkage. the estimation re-
sults can be found in table 1. the coefficients show the (multiplicative) 
impact of the explanatory variables on the underlying baseline hazards. 
positive coefficients imply an increase in the hazard of a conflict dyad 
ending, and thus shorter conflicts.
We begin with a standard model that includes characteristics of the 
rebel organization, resources in the conflict area, and country-level 
controls. Before turning to the main results we briefly discuss our find-
ings in regard to the control variables. Model 1 suggests that rebel or-
ganizations with territorial control are able to fight longer, while strong 
central command structures and a legal political wing are associated 
with shorter conflict durations. our findings related to the country-
level controls are mostly in line with the expectations of the existing 
literature. rebel organizations fighting in democratic countries tend 
to be enduring.74 While this result is possibly driven by particular cases 
like israel, india, and indonesia,75 we would also expect that democra-
73 We present the coefficients rather than the hazard ratios. We also tested all models and the 
included variables for a possible violation of the proportionality assumption. the tests suggest that the 
proportionality assumption is not violated in any of our models. We use the Efron method for ties.
74 this result holds regardless of whether we include a dummy variable or a continuous polity scale. 
note that the endogeneity concerns about polity to conflict highlighted by vreeland 2008 do not apply 
here, as we only look at polities in conflict.
75 See cunningham, gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009. We conducted a series of jackknife estimations 
where the models are reestimated omitting observations for individual countries. these tests did not 
suggest that any individual country is driving our results (see below).
tablE 1
cox-proportIonal hazard EstImatEs
  Model  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Ethnic Baseline Sons-of- Ethnic Veto 
 Conflict Model the-Soil Defection Players
Ethnic linkage –0.262*   0.222 
 (0.153)   (0.225) 
Ethnic linkage with   0.307 0.319  0.324 
 included group (b1)  (0.215) (0.215)  (0.224)
Ethnic linkage with   –0.419** –0.410** –0.737*** –0.392** 
 Excluded group (b2)  (0.170) (0.172) (0.249) (0.176)
territorial conflict 0.014 0.061 0.076 0.028 –0.025
 (0.193) (0.194) (0.203) (0.194) (0.203)
Strong central command 0.409*** 0.453*** 0.444*** 0.441*** 0.456***
 (0.145) (0.151) (0.155) (0.151) (0.150)
legal political Wing 0.358* 0.356* 0.351* 0.386** 0.333*
 (0.199) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183)
territorial control –0.335** –0.350** –0.354** –0.515** –0.392**
 (0.166) (0.170) (0.170) (0.239) (0.170)
democracy –0.834*** –0.849*** –0.838*** –0.820*** –0.925***
 (0.195) (0.196) (0.202) (0.194) (0.211)
ln gdp p.c. 0.078 0.086 0.090 0.099 0.108
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.079) (0.082)
ln population –0.040 –0.044 –0.045 –0.044 –0.043
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
natural resources –0.382** –0.354** –0.350** –0.366** –0.343**
 (0.164) (0.159) (0.159) (0.162) (0.160)
Sons-of-the-Soil   –0.093  
   (0.257)  
Ethnic linkage X    0.354   
 territorial control    (0.291) 
veto players     –0.183*
     (0.110)
Wald test: pr(b1 = b2)  0.003*** 0.003***  0.003***
     
n 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941
days at risk 637585 637585 637585 637585 637585
number of failures 272 272 272 272 272
log-likelihood –1147 –1143 –1143 –1142 –1141
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses
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cies are constrained from fighting as ruthlessly against insurgencies by 
domestic audiences. gdp per capita and population size do not signifi-
cantly impact conflict dyad termination.76 these results are consistent 
across all estimated models.
turning to our main results, model 1 includes our first key indepen-
dent variable, which indicates whether a rebel organization claims to 
fight on behalf of a politically relevant ethnic group and recruits from 
its members. hence, in a first step we examine whether ethnic linkages 
as such increase conflict duration. the results indicate some support 
for the contention that rebel organizations linked to at least one politi-
cally relevant ethnic group fight longer than rebel organizations with-
out such a link. the hazard of a conflict dyad ending decreases by 22 
percent if a rebel organization is linked to a politically relevant ethnic 
group. however, in line with most previous studies, this general eth-
nic effect is only marginally significant and not robust when particular 
cases are excluded from the analysis (results not shown).
to test our core hypotheses (h1a and h1b), we focus on rebel or-
ganizations with an explicit ethnic linkage and differentiate between 
organizations linked to excluded and included politically relevant eth-
nic groups. the baseline category contains rebel organizations that 
do not have an ethnic link. Model 2 suggests strong support for our 
main hypothesis. While rebel organizations related to included ethnic 
groups are not associated with longer conflict durations, organizations 
that claim to fight on behalf of excluded ethnic groups and recruit from 
these fight notably longer. in comparison with the reference category, 
these rebel organizations decrease the underlying baseline hazard by 32 
percent, thus significantly prolonging conflict dyad duration. this ef-
fect is even more pronounced when considering the difference between 
rebel organizations with different ethnic linkages. rebel organizations 
with a linkage to excluded groups have a hazard rate that is on aver-
age 50 percent lower than that of organizations that are affiliated with 
included ethnic groups. a Wald test indicates that this difference is 
highly statistically significant. however, the negative, that is, the con-
flict-shortening effect for rebels linked to included ethnic groups, is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. these findings suggest 
that the effect of ethnicity reported in model 1 is entirely driven by 
the subset of rebel organizations linked to excluded ethnic groups. the 
insight provides strong support for hypothesis 1b.
76 See, for example, fearon 2004.
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figure 3 provides a graphical interpretation of our main results. the 
left panel plots the predicted survival functions from model 1 for rebel 
organizations with and without an ethnic linkage.77 the y-axis displays 
the predicted survival percentage at a given conflict day (x-axis). the 
solid line represents the predicted values for rebel organizations with an 
ethnic linkage, while the dashed line refers to rebel organizations not 
associated with an ethnic group. the left panel reiterates the previous 
insight that model 1 predicts longer conflicts for rebel organizations 
with an ethnic linkage. for example, model 1 predicts that 50 percent 
of rebel organizations without an ethnic linkage cease to fight after 
about 950 days (2.6 years), whereas 50 percent of rebel organizations 
that are affiliated with an ethnic group are expected to end their activi-
ties after 1300 days (3.6 years). however, even though the difference is 
quite substantial in absolute terms, it is only marginally significant at 
conventional levels.
the right panel in figure 3 plots the predicted survival functions from 
model 2, which allows us to differentiate between rebel organizations 
that are linked to included (solid grey line) and excluded ethnic groups 
(solid black line). recall that rebel organizations linked to excluded eth-
nic groups fight significantly longer than organizations linked to included 
groups or organizations without an ethnic relation. Model 2 predicts 
that 50 percent of rebel organizations with a link to excluded ethnic 
groups end their fighting efforts after 1650 days (4.5 years), while the 
half-life of organizations that are affiliated with included ethnic groups 
is 550 days (1.5 years). again, rebel organizations without an ethnic 
linkage cease fighting after about 950 days (2.6 years).
altErnatIvE ExplanatIons
an important question is whether alternative explanations may un-
derlie our finding that rebel organizations linked to excluded ethnic 
groups are associated with longer conflicts. in particular, we consider 
two theoretical accounts that treat the state as an active party to the 
conflict,78 as well as a theory that addresses the difficulty of reaching an 
agreement.79 first, our empirical explanations could be driven by “sons 
of the soil” dynamics that fearon identifies to explain civil war dura-
tion.80 following Weiner’s original conceptualization, these are defined 
as conflicts between a peripheral geographically concentrated ethnic 
minority, that is, the sons of the soil, facing state-initiated migration 
77 We hold all other variables at their mean, or mode for dichotomous variables.
78 fearon 2004; kalyvas 2008.
79 cunningham 2006.
80 fearon 2004.
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to the minority’s perceived homelands by a dominant ethnic group 
from the center.81 Scarce resources, such as land or jobs, result in strong 
grievances and local struggles. Importantly, these grievances are pri-
marily state induced since the migration is assumed to be, at least partly, 
orchestrated by the government. They are likely to escalate in situations 
where the state sides with migrants to appease their support base. Be-
cause migration is path dependent and the government has an inter-
est in maintaining such policies, it is unable to credibly commit to a 
peace agreement. Fearon and Laitin argue that this renders sons-of -
the-soil conflicts especially difficult to end, thus prolonging the armed 
struggle.82 Relying on Weiner’s original definition we coded a binary 
indicator for such conflicts.83 However, model 3 suggests that adding 
our measure for sons-of-the-soil dynamics does not noticeably change 
our main results. Moreover, in our models, the sons-of-the-soil variable 
does not significantly influence rebel organization duration. Given the 
definition of such wars as conflicts involving “disadvantaged minori-
ties,” such wars are in our view best seen as a subset of ethnic conflicts 
typically involving ethnic groups excluded from state power. Indeed, it 
turns out that twenty-eight out of thirty dyads coded as sons-of-the-soil are 
linked to ethnic groups excluded from state power.84
81 Weiner 1978.
82 Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011.
83 Weiner 1978.
84 The only exceptions are the mfdc in Senegal, linked to the Diola, and the ufla in India, linked 
to the Assamese.
figure 3 
Predicted Survival functionS for model 1 and model 2
Model 2
Conflict Days
  0      1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Excluded ethnic linkage
No ethnic linkage
Included ethnic linkage
Model 1
Conflict Days
  0      1000   2000   3000   4000   5000   6000
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Su
rv
iv
al
 R
at
e Ethnic linkage
No ethnic linkage
104 world polItIcs 
 Second, we assess whether our results may capture ethnic defection, 
which kalyvas puts forward as the prime argument for why ethnic 
identities should be treated as fluid rather than fixed.85 it is described as 
follows: “(a) the incumbent state is willing and able to recruit members 
of the rebellious ethnic minority, (b) a substantial number of individuals 
collaborate with a political actor explicitly opposed to their own eth-
nic group, and (c) fighters and sympathizers switch sides from ethnic 
rebels to the state.”86 although the theory postulates a variable effect 
of ethnicity, this effect is not random but rather is a result of systematic 
state action. as kalyvas explains, “the behavioral potential of ethnicity 
is empirically variable … [and] a key determinant … is the willing-
ness of incumbent states facing ethnic rebellion to recruit ethnic defec-
tors, which in turn depends on their resources.”87 put differently, state 
strength, and in particular territorial control, is regarded as a systematic 
modifier of ethnic identities. in an attempt to partly operationalize this 
logic, ethnic defection should be less likely where rebel organizations 
enjoy territorial control, thus prolonging conflict. therefore, the effect 
of ethnicity should be stronger when rebels exercise territorial control 
and weaker or absent in conflicts where the rebels do not control terri-
tory. to assess this implication we interact Ethnic Linkage with Excluded 
Group with Territorial Control (model 4). the results reveal no signifi-
cant interaction effect, suggesting that the effect of ethnic nationalism 
is not an artifact of ethnic defection.88
finally, since our theoretical explanation for why ethnic nationalism 
prolongs civil wars rests on the argument that such conflicts are more 
difficult to resolve, we also consider the effect of veto players. in an 
application of the veto player framework, cunningham argues that the 
presence of multiple rebel organizations in the same conflict leads to 
narrower bargaining ranges, a higher risk of information asymmetries, 
last mover advantages, and shifting alliances.89 as a consequence, the 
more veto players, the more difficult conflicts are to resolve and the 
longer they endure. in model 5 we therefore control for the number of 
veto players, which we measure as the count of the number of active 
rebel organizations at the start of the conflict. although we find a nega-
tive effect for this variable, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, it does not affect our previous findings: rebel organizations 
85 kalyvas 2008.
86 kalyvas 2008, 1050.
87 kalyvas 2008, 1045.
88 a more direct test of the defection mechanism would require more fine-grained data on territo-
rial control.
89 cunningham 2006.
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linked to excluded ethnic groups fight significantly longer than those 
linked to included groups, as well as those without an explicit ethnic 
linkage. in sum, we find substantial support for our core hypotheses 1a 
and 1b.
having demonstrated strong empirical evidence that ethnic exclu-
sion is related to longer conflicts, we turn to secondary evidence and 
extend the analysis by examining whether the effect of exclusion is con-
ditional on the conflict outcome (hypotheses 2a–3b). in the theoretical 
section we argued that longer conflicts result from exclusive policies 
which (1) constrain the state’s willingness to accept settlements and (2) 
increase the ability of rebel organizations to recruit from ethnic group 
members with strong grievances. We therefore estimate five further 
models that account for different conflict outcomes, namely, victories 
(by either party), government victories, rebel victories, agreements, and 
low activity. the results can be found in table 2. Models 6 to 8 address 
decisive victories. We find some support for hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 
3b as conflict dyads involving rebel organizations linked to excluded 
groups appear less likely to end in victories, both by the government 
and the rebels, as compared with rebel groups linked to included ethnic 
groups or those without an explicit ethnic linkage (albeit not always 
with statistical significance).90 Model 9 shows that rebel organizations 
linked to included groups are more likely to obtain negotiated agree-
ments (Wald test). however, we find no evidence that this also holds 
for nonethnic rebel organizations. one possible reason is that this cat-
egory potentially conflates various types of conflicts, including cease-
fires. for completeness, model 10 considers the residual category of 
conflicts that fade out. While there seems to be some indication that 
ethnicity makes this outcome less likely, there appears to be no differ-
ence in terms of political status. however, since there are only three 
cases of such infighting on behalf of included groups, this result must 
be taken with a grain of salt. in sum, we find that ethnic exclusion is 
significantly related to longer conflicts because parties cannot agree to 
a negotiated settlement, including victories as implicit settlements and 
negotiated agreements as more explicit settlements. this yields strong 
support for our theoretical conjecture that rebel organizations fighting 
on behalf of excluded ethnic groups are generally more willing to ac-
cept longer periods of fighting until a decisive outcome is reached, and 
that governments may be impeded in their ability to accept any type of 
90 the lack of statistical significance can possibly be attributed to a low number of positive cases; 
for example, out of only fifteen rebel victories by rebel organizations, just four are achieved by those 
linked to excluded ethnic groups.
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settlement. thus, we have further disaggregated the theoretical mecha-
nisms that link ethnopolitical exclusion to long durations.
robustnEss chEcks
We estimated a number of alternative models to assess the robustness 
of our results. in principle, our results could be affected by problems 
of selection, since excluded ethnic groups are more likely to fight to 
begin with. however, in this case the selection mechanism is driven by 
tablE 2
compEtIng rIsks EstImatEs
  Model  
 6 7 8 9 10  
  Government Rebel  Low 
 Victories Victories Victories Agreements Activity 
Ethnic linkage with –0.061 –0.133 0.073 1.210** –0.523 
 included group (b1) (0.315) (0.378) (0.678) (0.529) (0.696) 
Ethnic linkage with –0.713** –0.794** –0.680 0.172 –0.519 
 Excluded group (b2) (0.283) (0.367) (0.452) (0.316) (0.361) 
territorial conflict –0.176 0.576 –2.090*** 0.147 0.018 
 (0.305) (0.377) (0.594) (0.428) (0.386) 
Strong central command 1.069*** 0.536* 1.571*** 0.092 –0.275 
 (0.205) (0.295) (0.361) (0.322) (0.414) 
legal political Wing 0.492** 0.540* 0.421 –0.060 0.330 
 (0.234) (0.310) (0.395) (0.531) (0.320) 
territorial control –0.313 –0.141 –0.282 0.137 –0.503 
 (0.261) (0.320) (0.358) (0.333) (0.425) 
democracy –1.099*** –0.827** –1.598** –0.853 –0.654* 
 (0.352) (0.393) (0.686) (0.521) (0.353) 
ln gdp p.c. –0.077 0.083 –0.270 0.003 0.025 
 (0.138) (0.173) (0.202) (0.228) (0.165) 
ln population –0.092 –0.040 –0.178 –0.317** 0.210* 
 (0.082) (0.108) (0.122) (0.153) (0.113) 
natural resources –0.361 –0.286 –0.482 –0.613 0.154 
 (0.244) (0.327) (0.416) (0.380) (0.394) 
Wald test: pr(b1 = b2) 0.094* 0.154 0.357 0.073* 0.995 
      
n 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941 
days at risk 637585 637585 637585 637585 637585 
number of failures 115 67 48 56 68 
log-likelihood –447.7 –275.3 –165.1 –232.7 –296.7 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; robust standard errors in parentheses
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an observable factor—exclusion—for which we control in our analyses, 
thus avoiding omitted variable bias. however, such bias will arise if an 
omitted variable is correlated with both exclusion and duration.91 in an 
attempt to address this problem, we briefly consider some possible can-
didates and perform a set of robustness checks.92 the core specification 
is the same as model 2 in table 1.
the robustness checks are presented in table 3. Model 11 includes a 
set of geographic variables, the distance of the conflict zone to the capi-
tal and border locations, previously found to be associated with pro-
longed conflict.93 if ethnic exclusion affects mainly peripheral groups, 
this could drive our results. the estimates demonstrate, however, that 
including variables measuring whether the conflict area intersects with 
state borders and measuring the distance to the capital does not change 
our main results.
as argued in the theoretical section, states may engage in exclusion 
to maximize resource extraction and in-group redistribution. While 
lootable resources are a prime candidate, they can also benefit rebel or-
ganizations if they manage to control the necessary territory. to further 
investigate the effect of natural resources, model 12 tests whether any 
particular resource type drives the compound effect of natural resources 
in the conflict area and whether disaggregating this variable has any 
effect on our main estimates. although all three types yield negative 
coefficients, these are not significant and do not affect the magnitude 
or the significance of the coefficients for ethnopolitical linkages.
a further explanation attributes exclusion to capacity and strength, 
since it is less difficult and risky for states to exclude weak groups. We 
therefore test whether mobilization and fighting capacity (model 13) or 
the balance of power vis-à-vis the government (model 14) could dimin-
ish our findings related to ethnopolitical linkages. While the capacity 
variables do not significantly affect the length of conflict, compound 
measures of rebel strength show that weak rebel organizations (reference 
91 as argued above, apart from the studies considered here, the determinants of exclusion are 
largely unknown.
92 two other strategies exist to tackle this problem. first, in principle, matching could provide a 
solution to the problem, but this is highly problematic here due to the small sample size of just 198 
rebel organizations. Second, estimation techniques that address selection on unobservables require in-
strumental variables that are difficult to find, and that the units of observation can be observed in the 
selection processes. By definition, however, rebel organizations are observed only once they engage in 
conflict, and it is difficult to set up a super sample of “potential groups” to consider selection to conflict. 
to our knowledge there exists no global data set on political organizations of which rebel organiza-
tions would be a subset, and the only available estimator of which we are aware (Boehmke, Morey, and 
Shannon 2006) does not allow for time-varying covariates and is restricted to a correlation coefficient 
between -.25 and .25.
93 Buhaug, gates, and lujala 2009.
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category in model 14) fight the longest. additionally, we estimate a 
model controlling for whether the conflict takes place after the end of 
the cold war, that is, post 1989 (model 15). kalyvas and Balcells argue 
that the international system “shapes the military dimension of civil 
wars through its impact on the relative power of the contestants.”94 
in particular, the cold war period is characterized by “robust rebellion” 
that benefits rebel organizations; it in turn is associated with long dura-
tions.95 our results suggest that rebel organizations are associated with 
shorter conflict durations during the post–cold war period. Most im-
portantly, our main finding that rebel organizations which are associ-
ated with politically excluded ethnic groups fight the longest is robust 
to the inclusion of capacity, strength, and post–cold war controls.
Model 16 considers the effect of democratic institutions, this time 
employing the full polity scale. Since inclusiveness is a core principle 
of democracy, we would expect lower levels of exclusion in democra-
cies, while responsiveness (domestic audiences) and other democratic 
norms, such as concerns for human rights, may impose restrictions on 
governments’ ability to fight rebel organizations. again we find a nega-
tive effect, suggesting that democratic governments tend to fight longer, 
but this does not affect the results associated with ethnic exclusion.
We also examine the effect of potential unobserved heterogeneity, 
both between conflicts and countries (models 17 and 18). in other 
words, we check whether our results are an artifact of unmeasured 
country- or conflict-constant variation. in order to do this within a 
cox-proportional hazards framework, we include a gamma frailty term 
as a random effect.96 although the variance for this term is statisti-
cally significant in both cases, it does not attenuate our core results. 
on the contrary, across all model specifications the frailty models yield 
the largest coefficients for rebel organizations linked to excluded ethnic 
groups.
in addition, we check whether our results are robust with respect 
to alternative estimation approaches by estimating several parametric 
hazards models (Weibull, log-normal, and log-logistic), all of which 
yielded similar and significant results (not shown). to assess whether 
our findings are driven by particular conflicts or countries, we reesti-
mate model 3 with groupwise jackknifing of our sample by (1) conflicts 
and (2) countries; we also bootstrap (models 19–21). our estimated 
coefficients do not change and the standard errors stay small. finally, 
94 kalyvas and Balcells 2010, 416.
95 See also hironaka 2005.
96 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, chap. 9.
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we also estimate variance inflation factors to check for potential (higher 
order) multicollinearity, but find them to be well below critical thresh-
olds for all the independent variables.
conclusIon
this article examines the role of ethnicity in the context of civil war 
duration. focusing on actors and agency in civil wars, it presents a theo-
retical account that links rebel organizations and ethnic groups and also 
includes the state as an active actor. in particular, our main argument is 
that exclusionary policies enacted by the state are likely to influence the 
salience of ethnonationalist grievances. More specifically, exclusionary 
politics not only reveal state preferences that impact heavily on the abil-
ity and willingness of incumbent governments to accept settlements, 
but also lead members of ethnic groups that are systematically excluded 
from state power to develop stronger group solidarity and to become 
more cost tolerant. Such rebel organizations are therefore more likely 
to fight longer conflicts. it is these grievances that allow rebel organiza-
tions to recruit and fight on behalf of such groups and to maintain their 
fighting base for longer periods of time.
 thus, contrary to what is assumed by many scholars, we find that 
ethnic conflicts do not last longer because ethnic loyalties are rigid and 
difficult to transcend; nor do they last longer because ethnic identi-
ties per se help overcome collective action problems among the rebels. 
rather, it is the unique combination of ascriptive ethnicity and state-
enacted exclusion along such categorical lines that impacts conflict 
duration. hence, conflicts last longer when ethnicity is charged with 
ethnonationalist grievances. our results thus point directly to institu-
tions and policies that make such conflicts less likely to begin with and 
also help them come to an end, namely, ethnic power sharing through 
inclusion. in contrast to the essentialist view that deeply held ethnic 
identities drive such violence, we argue that grievances are by no means 
fixed. indeed our analysis shows that they depend on policies of eth-
nonationalist exclusion. although the literature on power sharing high-
lights a number of pitfalls in such arrangements,97 representation at the 
political center could therefore at least in principle be a powerful tool 
to alleviate grievances and thereby shorten armed conflicts.
We believe that our approach is more complete, since it covers a more 
extensive set of actors and also offers more causal depth. By theoretically 
97 for example, rothchild and roeder 2005.
112 world polItIcs 
and empirically disaggregating the political effect of ethnicity, it goes 
beyond the current literature by explaining variation in the level of 
grievances as the result of state action. our empirical results provide 
strong support for the argument that ethnicity affects conflict dura-
tion where states exclude large parts of the population along categorical 
lines. if rebel organizations are linked to these excluded ethnic groups, 
they fight significantly longer. therefore, it is not ethnicity as such but 
rather ethnonationalist policies that drive conflict duration.
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